Political situation in Europe in the first half of the XVII century

While the idea was widely invoked, it could predict few actual outcomes. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the balance of power suggested that alliances would be short-lived and shifting, arising as required. From the late-17th century to the death of Louis XIV, the balance of power usually involved a coalition of powers gathering to oppose French ambitions. No state felt it could afford to operate alone in such a conflict, and most were constantly negotiating either to secure allies, or to be promised subsidies or new territories for becoming allies. Thus, even if the balance of power advanced equilibrium, it also produced a pervasive feeling of insecurity and continuing preoccupation with the self-interest of each state; with reason of state, which elevated the interests of the state to the highest value of politics; and statecraft. (Does the principle of "balance of power" govern international relations today?)

The principle of balance of power was most famously used to restrain the ambitions of King Louis XIV of France. Louis ruled from 1643 to 1715, and under him France became the superpower of its day, constantly trying to expand its territory. To restrain him, the other European powers formed military coalitions. For example:

In the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697), England, the Dutch Republic, and several German states fought to keep France from conquering large parts of Germany that were adjacent to the French frontier.

In the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), England, the Dutch Republic, German states, Austria, Prussia, and Portugal all formed a grand alliance to keep the Spanish royal line from switching from the Hapsburgs to the Bourbons, which, it was feared, would make Spain and its possessions a tool for French interests. The alliance could not finally keep Louis XIV's grandson from inheriting the throne, but it did compel Spain to give up its major European territories outside Spain (the Spanish Netherlands and southern Italy). When this war ended with the Peace of Utrecht (1713), France had lost some of its American colonies and had been prevented from expanding into the Low Countries and Germany. Spain no longer had strategically placed domains on the English Channel or in Italy. England and Austria gained territory, and the Prussian prince gained the title of king. For several decades, the rest of Europe feared that Louis XIV's France would dominate the entire continent. Coalitions and wars, however, restored the balance of power.

Another concept important to the state system was the principle of "dynastic legitimacy." A dynasty in the early modern period was a family that ruled a state by virtue of an inherited right. The principle of dynastic legitimacy justified most regimes up until the late-18th century, when the idea of "popular sovereignty" became common. This meant that international politics and wars revolved around a few families. Louis XIV's famous claim, "L'état, c'est moi" ("I am the state"), reflects the importance of the royal figure as the representative of the state. Dynastic legitimacy meant that when no male heir survived the death of a king, bloody succession crises often followed. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) and the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) are notable examples.

Underlying Conditions of the State System, 1648-1770

The new state system did not emerge within a vacuum. Particular economic and social conditions affected its development.

In eastern Europe, roughly defined as the area east of the Elbe River (in the middle of modern Germany), state economies and armies were supported by peasant labor. Peasants, or serfs, were tied to the land, providing both agricultural labor and drafted soldiers for aristocrat-led armies. Prussia's military might, for example, was built on serf labor. The local noble landlord, the Junker, had the responsibility of raising soldiers from the villages in his region. Towns had to pay heavy taxes and provide material to support these forces. The Prussian bureaucracy devoted much effort to mobilizing human and material resources for maintenance of an army.

In western Europe, state economies were more highly developed, and peasant labor could not simply be pressed into military service. Governments used tax revenues to hire captains who recruited paid soldiers. A general "draft," or conscription, came into use in western Europe only in the era of the French Revolution. Armies were also supported indirectly, through commercial surpluses based upon trade with far-flung colonial empires. Some Western powers (England and Holland in particular) developed sophisticated financial organizations as well. Joint stock companies allowed investors to pool wealth for business and trading ventures. Central banks (e.g., the Bank of England, founded in 1694 - later a national bank, then a private monopoly granted to shareholders who were willing to finance government needs) allowed some states to borrow vast sums from their subjects (the origin of a national debt). England's great military asset was not a large army - although it did raise armies as war required - but a preeminent navy, as well as the capacity to subsidize its continental allies (such as Prussia in the Seven Years' War). This capacity rested on the most advanced financial system in the world. The Bank of England provided security such that loans could be raised, and the English upper classes - peers and gentry - accepted heavy taxing to fund national defense. (In contrast, the French nobility claimed immunity from major taxes.)

So military financing differed between eastern and western Europe. Warfare was recurrent and pervasive during the era of the new state system. Individual wars, however, were somewhat less destructive than in the 17th century. Sieges and slaughters of civilians diminished. In the 19th century, diplomacy would more effectively secure the balance of power, but in the 18th century, balance of power was chiefly secured through continuous warfare. England and France, for instance, were at war for about 56 years between 1688 and 1815. States fought until they were militarily or financially exhausted. They would then trade territory in Europe or in their colonies, settling an uneasy peace until the next war. The requirements of 18th-century warfare required a great expansion in the size of European armies. The table below reflects that expansion of soldiers in the first half of the 18th century.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of the sovereignty of nation-states on their territory, with no role for external agents in domestic structures.

Scholars of international relations have identified the modern, Western originated, international system of states, multinational corporations, and organizations, as having begun at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Both the basis and the conclusion of this view have been attacked by some[who?] revisionist academics and politicians, with revisionists questioning the significance of the Peace, and some commentators and politicians attacking the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states.

Traditional view

Adherents to the concept of a Westphalian system refer to the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years' War, in which the major European countries at the time (the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, France, Sweden and the Dutch Republic) agreed to respect the principle of territorial integrity. In the Westphalian system, the national interests and goals of states (and later nation-states) were widely assumed to go beyond those of any citizen or any ruler. States became the primary institutional agents in an interstate system of relations. The Peace of Westphalia is said to have ended attempts to impose supranational authority on European states. The "Westphalian" doctrine of states as independent agents was bolstered by the rise in 19th century thought of nationalism, under which legitimate states were assumed to correspond to nations—groups of people united by language and culture.

The Westphalian system reached its peak in the late 19th century. Although practical considerations still led powerful states to seek to influence the affairs of others, forcible intervention by one country in the domestic affairs of another was less frequent between 1850 and 1900 than in most previous and subsequent periods (Leurdijk 1986).[dubious – discuss]

The Peace of Westphalia is important in modern international relations theory, and is often defined as the beginning of the international system with which the discipline deals.

International relations theorists have identified several key principles of the Peace of Westphalia, which explain the Peace's significance and its impact on the world today:

The principle of the sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self determination

The principle of legal equality between states

The principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state

These principles are shared by the "realist" international relations paradigm today, which explains why the system of states is referred to as "The Westphalian System".

Both the idea of Westphalian sovereignty and its applicability in practice have been questioned from the mid-20th century onwards from a variety of viewpoints. Much of the debate has turned on the ideas of internationalism and globalization which, in various interpretations, appear to conflict with Westphalian sovereignty.

Modern views on the Westphalian system

 

The Westphalian system is used as a shorthand by academics to describe the system of states which make up the world today.

In 1998, at a Symposium on the Continuing Political Relevance of the Peace of Westphalia, the then NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana said that "humanity and democracy [were] two principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order" and levied a criticism that "the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration."

In 2000, Germany's Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer referred to the Peace of Westphalia in his Humboldt Speech, which argued that the system of European politics set up by Westphalia was obsolete: "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions."

In the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks, Lewis ‘Atiyyatullah, who claims to represent the terrorist network al-Qaeda, declared that "the international system built up by the West since the Treaty of Westphalia will collapse; and a new international system will rise under the leadership of a mighty Islamic state".

It has also been claimed that globalization is bringing an evolution of the international system past the sovereign Westphalian state.

Benedict Anderson refers to putative “nations”  as "imagined communities."

Others speak favorably of the Westphalian state, notably European nationalists and American paleoconservative Pat Buchanan. Some such supporters of the Westphalian state oppose socialism and some forms of capitalism for undermining the nation state. A major theme of Buchanan's political career, for example, has been attacking globalization, critical theory, neoconservatism, and other philosophies he considers detrimental to today's Western nations.

 

 

 

Globalization and Westphalian sovereignty

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the emerging literature on globalization focused primarily on the erosion of interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Much of this literature was primarily concerned to criticize realist models of international politics in which the Westphalian notion of the state as a unitary agent are taken as axiomatic (Camilleri and Falk 1992).

The European Union concept of shared sovereignty is also somewhat contrary to historical views of Westphalian sovereignty, as it provides for external agents to interfere in nations' internal affairs.

In a 2008 article Phil Williams links the rise of terrorism and other violent non-state actors (VNSAs), which pose a threat to the Westphalian sovereignty of the state, to globalization.