Siege of Leningrad

Siege of Leningrad

The  Siege  of  Leningrad , now St. Petersburg, lasted from September 1941 to January 1944, when food and military supplies were brought to the city via Lake Ladoga, the only route named "the Road of Life" that connected the city with the mainland. In winter, exhausted people were transported to the mainland by trucks that crossed the frozen lake under constant enemy bombardment. In January 1942, in the midst of an unusually cold winter, the city's food rations reached an all time low of only 250 grams of bread per person a day. Prior to the opening of the Ladoga lifeline, tens of thousands of people died in Leningrad of cold and starvation.

Soviet troops managed to break the siege in January 1943.

1943 saw fierce fighting between the Red Army and the Nazis, who desperately tried to maintain the strategic Leningrad stranglehold by notably building three major defensive lines in the area. A sophisticated network of enemy trenches, minefields and barbed wire entanglements prevented the Soviet troops from gaining an easy victory.    

Persistently pushing forward, Soviet soldiers broke the siege on January 18, 1943 in a hard-won move that was preceded by the enemy's desperate attempts to try and pre-empt the Red Army from launching the decisive offensive on January 14. The  siege  was fully lifted on January 27, 1944, when Nazi troops were significantly thrown back from  Leningrad . That day also saw a salute given in celebration of the lifting of the  Siege  of  Leningrad .

The Battle of Kursk

The greatest tank battle in history occurred at Kursk. It began on July 5th, 1943 and it ended ignominiously eight days later. This was the last major offensive launched by the Germans on the Eastern Front. During the battle the last hope of a Nazi victory over the Soviet Union faded into oblivion and it has since been considered to be a turning point in the war. At Kursk the Red Army proved that it could defeat a German summer offensive -- something that even the victory at Stalingrad had failed to show. However, the context in which Kursk took place should also be kept in mind.

The war had already turned against the Axis in Europe by the time the battle of Kursk took place. This is primarily because the military weight of the western Allies was noticeable at the front at this time while it was effectively discounted by German planners earlier in the war. Nothing that the Allies did in this period constituted a decisive contribution. Yet the strategic bombing campaign had become significant and forced substantial elements of the Luftwaffe to defend the homeland, the battle of the Atlantic had effectively been decided in the Allies favor, and the Axis surrender in Africa threatened to unhinge the Italian war effort. Each, in its own way, required resources committed to the all consuming Eastern Front. So, while at Stalingrad the Germans had still hoped for a conclusive victory over the Soviet Union, at Kursk they wanted to force a draw.

German planning for the offensive had begun in March. Originally conceived by Manstein as a follow-up to his triumphant recapture of Kharkov earlier in the month, it was delayed several times, over several months, for new weapons and further building-up. Evidence of Soviet might and the psychological pressure on the German command to produce a clear victory both contributed to the postponements. Hitler gave his generals remarkable leeway in planning this battle and what they produced was a transparent scheme that Soviet senior planners easily anticipated.

Operation Citadel, the German code name for the attack, was intended to eliminate the Soviet salient centered on Kursk through two pincer attacks at its neck. In the north, units of Model's 9th Army, part of Kluge's Army Group Center, were to attack southward. Units of 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, both part of Manstein's Army Group South, were to attack northward. If successful, it would eliminate a significant portion of Red Army strength. By achieving this, the Germans hoped to eliminate the possibility of a Soviet offensive in 1943 and thereby gain freedom to withdraw units to the west to meet the anticipated Allied invasion of Europe. It was an uninspired plan that reflected German strategic uncertainty.