The pragmatic aspects of the sentence

interpret the symbols occurring in the sentence. The way is then clear and

direct:

                        sentence  __________________ meaning

 

Where a first-order predicate language is concerned, no problems occur. Until

the late sixties most of logicians seemed to be unaware of how narrow a part

of natural language could be covered by the language of predicate logic.

Classical logic satisfies the principle of extensionality. Thus, the truth

value of compound sentences depends only on truth values of its components.

In natural language the principle of extensionality is very seldom satisfied.

Lets consider a typical example:

(1) Kepler knew that more than 6 planets go around the sun.

is false, while

(2) Kepler knew that 6 > 9.

is true. As a consequence sentences built up with the operator:

(3) Kepler knew that ... .

don't satisfy the extensionality principle. The components of (1), and (2)

- sentences “6 > 9” and “More than 6 planet goes around the sun.” are

both true, and so according to the principle of extensionality both (1) and

(2) should have the same truth value.

(3) is a typical example of an intensional operator. To find the meaning

of a sentence like (1) or (2) it is not enough to examine the meanings of its

components. We have to proceed in more complicated way than the picture

above shows. The meaning of (1) depends not only on how things are but also

on Kepler's knowledge. The possible-world semantics approach invented by

Saul Kripke presents a powerful theoretic tool for both logical and pragmatic

investigations.

The major success of Kripke's semantics for modal logic has been a big

step forward in the direction of logical pragmatics. Kripkean semantics has

solved the problem of meaning for intentional expressions.

                                              

                                                 Possible world

               Sentence                                                meaning

 

Another aspect of the structure of interpreting sentences has came from

the study of the phenomenon of indexicality. The sentence:

(4) Now I am here

cannot be uttered without being true. Although we wouldn't say that it

is a tautology, we must admit that (4) is always true. Hence the rule of

necessitation makes us accept the sentence:

(5) It is necessary that now I an here.

However (5) seems to be impossible to accept. It is purely accidental whether

I am here or elsewhere.

Because of the problems arising from interpreting such sentences logi-

cians invented the notion of an eternal sentence. Thus an eternal sentence is

a sentence whose meaning doesn't depend on who utters it (or where/when

it was uttered, etc.) . The default assumption was that any sentence is

fully equivalent to an eternal sentence. As a consequence, there would be

no need to use sentences like (4) and no need to investigate sentences like

them. Although some logicians, including those as influential as Quine, have

argued against this assumption, it is nevertheless still considered to be valid,

especially when we teach logic to students, where we analyse examples com-

ing from our everyday language. From the pragmatic point of view it is a

secondary question if or to what extent this assumption is true. The point

is that occasional sentences like (4) are common from the point of view of

language-use. We cannot then pretend that that they don't exist nor con-

sider them as special, informal, or improper. It seems to be necessary that

there be a logic of natural language to cope with them directly.

Since early seventies many logical solutions of the problem of occasion-

ally has been proposed. David Kaplan (1978), Stalnaker (1970), Max. J.

Cresswell (1973) have constructed logical systems which step by step have

come closer and closer to common language use. We shall skip the details

here. Roughly speaking, the result was that we have to distinguish between

the sentence and what is exactly said - (between utterance and proposition).

The route from the former to latter goes via the context. All the occasional

utterances are context-sensitive. Nevertheless, as far as the author knows,

nobody has yet given a satisfactory definition of context. Bar Hillel has ar-

gued that a satisfactory definition of context is unlikely to be given. Anyway,

we can agree that the context of an utterance is determined by the circum-

stances of utterance. By knowing them we know the context. All this leads

us to the procedure depicted in the following diagram:

                                    

 

                                         context                                    possible world

           utterance                                           proposition                            meaning

 

Suppose we have heard an utterance of a sentence. To find out what exactly

is said (a proposition) we first need a context and then, by looking eventually

at the appropriate possible worlds, we are able to establish the meaning of

the given sentence.

One important step is missing here. A competent language user utters

a sentence. We necessarily have to distinguish between a sentence as an abstract language entity and an utterance a concrete case of using a given

sentence. All this leads us to the diagram above.

Let us quickly recall the process of interpreting a given utterance: An

utterance is made. Using the context, we can come to know what exactly

is said. We recognise a proposition. Then we interpret it using (finally) the

possible worlds to get its meaning logical value.

Let us look at (4) in a given situation. In this situation we have:

(6) Bin Laden is in Torun on April 30, 2002, at 2 pm.

This is true if Bin Laden says at the appropriate time and in the appropriate

place (or false if he doesn't) but by no means is it a tautology. Nevertheless

(5) is false because, as the diagram above shows, the necessitation operator

doesn't act on utterances like (4). It acts on propositions like (6) and of (6)

we would never would say that it is true.

The main problems of how to interpret a given sentence centre upon the

properties of a context and the ways in which a context influences what is

conveyed by a given utterance. The central problem here is to describe the

mechanism we use to use the context to find out the proposition intended by

the speaker.

As argues above, we have to distinguish two types of meanings: that of

the utterance (sentences in context) and that the of proposition. The later

is just the logical meaning { thus according to Fregean paradigm of logic it

is just the logical value of a given proposition, while the former has purely

pragmatic roots. It can be identified with Gricean notion of nn-meaning. The

remaining two sections of this paper are devoted to a discussion of pragmatic

meaning in the following sense:

Grice proposed the following definition (see Levinson (1983) p. 16) of nn

meaning: a speaker S means-nn z by uttering U the a hearer H if and only

if

(i) S intended U to cause some effect z in recipient H.

(ii) S intended (i) to be achieved simply by H recognizing that intention

(i).

The analysis presented below as well as some of examples a based on

Grice (1989), Levinson (1983), Leech (1983).

2.2.Gricean Conversational Maxims.

The work of H.P. Grice is a milestone of pragmatics. Grice was a student

of conversation, and he enunciated the basic principle that, outside of the

theater of the absurd, most conversationalists seem to hold to: the Cooper-

ative Principle. It has four sub-parts or maxims, that conversationalists are

enjoined to respect.

 

(A) The maxim of quality. Speakers' contributions ought to be true.

(B) The maxim of quantity. Speakers' contributions should be as informative

as required; not saying either too little or too much.

(C) The maxim of relevance. Contributions should relate to the purposes of

the exchange.

(D) The maxim of manner. Contributions should be orderly and brief, avoid-

ing obscurity and ambiguity.

The maxims works in two modes: the speaker mode and the hearer mode.

The speaker mode has a normative sense: Formulate an utterance in such a

way as to keep to all the maxims. The hearer mode is more sophisticated:

When interpreting an utterance remember that an speaker kept to all the

maxims. So when you find out that an speaker has flouted some maxims you

have to interpret the utterance anew. Let us consider two examples:

S: Where is Bill?

H: There is a yellow Porsche outside Sue's house.

 

S: Can you tell me the time?

H: Well, the mail has just come.

In both examples the simplest hearer interpretation of what H has said is

that he did break the communication. So, according to the hearer mode of

exploiting the maxims of relevance S should interpret the utterance anew

appealing to their common knowledge that Bill is a friend of Sue and has a

yellow Porsche and that postman comes always at 11 am.

Grice was using observations of the difference between "what is said"

and "what is meant" to show that people actually do follow these maxims

in conversation. We can see how this works in considering the maxim of quantity at work in the following made-up exchange between parent and child:

 

Parent: “Did you finish your homework?”

Child: “I finished my algebra”.

Parent: “Well, get busy and finish your English, too!”

 

Further proof is that when people "violate" or "°out" these maxims,

particular meanings are conveyed. It is certainly possible that the child could

come back and (typically in a teasing tone) say that he had also finished all

his other subjects. After all, he did not say he had not finished the rest of

his homework. If you were to hear someone described as having “one good

leg”, you would be justified in assuming the person's other leg was bad, even

though nothing particular had been said about it. Conversationalists are

justified in making the inferences they typically do, because they as well as

Grice have understood the difference between "what is said" and "what is

meant".

The maxim of manner is crucial for understanding the difference between

the following two utterances:

 

Miss Singer produced a series of sounds corresponding closely to the score of

an aria from Rigoletto.

 

Miss Singer sang an aria from Rigoletto.

 

The content of both the sentences is more or less the same. The latter

utterance expresses it direct way. While interpreting the former utterance,

the hearer must ask herself why the speaker expresses so simple a matter

in such a complicated way. The hearer mode of maxim of manner suggests

that there must be some reasons for such an utterance. The speaker wants

to avoid of using the word sing, stressing singing isn't what Miss Singer is

doing. This means Miss Singer is a bad singer.

This volume is well-bound and free of typographical errors.

This example flouts the maxim of quantity saying less than is normal for

a book review, and probably the maxim of relevance as well, since binding

and typographical errors are less significant to potential readers than the

book's contents. What is implied is: “This volume stinks!”.

Using maxim of quantity utterance “John has three cows” entails that

John has exactly three cows.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

The purpose of this chapter has been to define the pragmatic peculiarities of the sentence by analyzing its  different pragmatic types. So, I have presented the examples of these pragmatic aspects above. The findings of this investigation can be summarized in the  following way. First, in chapter 1, I have analyzed the theoretical aspects of pragmatics and pragmatic values. Second, in chapter 2, I have researched pragmatics of the sentence and considered some examples of them. So, the aim of work was achieved.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

List of references

1. Bach, Kent (1999a), "The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters," in Ken Turner (ed.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View, Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 65-84;
2. Bach, Kent and Robert M. Harnish (1979), Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
3. Bach, Kent (1994), "Conversational Impliciture," Mind & Language 
4. Bar-Hillel, Y. [1971] Pragmatics of Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht.
5. Blokh M. A Course in Theoretical Grammar.
6. Cresswell, M.J., (1973) Logics and Languages, Methuen and Co. Ltd., Lon-

don

7. Green, G. (1989): Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
8. Grice, P., (1989) Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.

9. Grice, H.P., (1967) Logic and conversation, William James Lectures. Ms.,

Harvard University.

10. Kaplan, D., [1978] On the logic of demonstratives, Journal of Philosophical

Logic, vol. 8, pp. 99 - 115.

11. Leech, G., [1983] Principles of Pragmatics
12. Levinson, Stephen, 1983, Pragmatics, New York: Cambridge University Press. (One of the first systematic introductions to pragmatics.)
13. Montague, R. (1974): Pragmatics. In R. Thomason (ed.): Formal Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
14. Stalnaker, R. (1974): Pragmatic Presuppositions. In M. Munitz and P. Unger (eds.)
15. Travis, Charles, 1997, “Pragmatics,” in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds) 1997, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 87–107.